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Child Witnesses 
and Procedural Fairness 
Bennett L. Gershmant 
Abstract 
Professr Gershman S Article notes that courts and Iawmakers have 
changedprocedural and evidentiary rules to protect child witnesses in 
child sexual abuse cases. Gershman discusses how courts apply the 
changed rules with carefirl scrutiny in an effort to ensure that the in- 
terests of the child witness and the accused defendant are appropriately 
balanced. 0 
I. Introduction 
Children as victim witnesses generate unique concerns within the legal 
system because of their vulnerability, immaturity, and impressionability. 
Courts and lawmakers increasingly have recognized these concerns and 
have attempted to adjust substantive, procedural, and evidentiary rules 
to accommodate the special problems of child witnesses, particularly in 
the area of child sexual abuse prosecutions. These adjustments have made 
prosecuting such cases much easier. Broadening the legal rules to 
enhance the ability to prosecute child abuse cases more effectively also 
includes the risk that traditional notions of procedural justice will be 
sacrificed, and therefore innocent defendants will be convicted of 
especially heinous crimes.' 
A.B. (1963), Princeton University; J.D. (1966), New York University School of 
Law. Professor Gershman teaches evidence, criminal procedure, and constitutional law 
at Pace University School of Law. 
'SeeTomev.UnitedStates, 513U.S. 150,166,115 S.Ct.696,705,130L.Ed.2d 
574, 588 (1995) ("Courts must be sensitive to the difficulties attendant upon the 
prosecution of alleged child abusers. In almost all cases a youth is the prosecution's 
only eyewitness. But '[tlhis Court cannot alter evidentiaryrules merely because litigants 
might prefer different rules in a particular class of cases."' (quoting United States v. 
Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 322, 112 S. Ct. 2503, 2507, 120 L. Ed. 2d 255, 262 (1992)); 
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836,867-68, 110 S. Ct. 3 157,3175, 11 1 L. Ed. 2d 666, 
692-93 (1 990) (noting the increased risk ofinnocent defendants convicted ofparticularly 
heinous crimes) (Scalia, J., dissenting); United States v. Bighead, 128 F.3d 1329,1337 
(9th Cir. 1997) (commenting that, "[ilf the rules of evidence are relaxed in order to 
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As everyone knows, courtroom testimony may be highly traumatic for 
young children. Various procedural changes have been enacted to protect 
the child witness's mental and emotional well-being while preparing for 
and giving such testimony. Statutes in many jurisdictions provide 
substitutes for live in-court testimony of children. These statutes 
authorize testimony by closed-circuit television2 and videotaped deposi- 
t i o n ~ . ~  Such procedures necessarily impinge on a defendant's constitu- 
tional right to face-to-face confiontation with his ac~user .~ Meaningful 
confrontation may also be obstructed by rules that insulate the child fiom 
having to look at the acchsed5 and by rules that limit effective cross- 
e~arnination.~ Critical issues include whether such procedures are 
necessary to protect the child's mental and emotional well-being and 
whether the court has made individualized findings to justifL the, 
permit the successfbl prosecution of such cases, we gravely damage the rights of the 
accused and invite the repetition, in a new form, of the kind of justice associated with 
the witchcraft trials of seventeenth-century Salem, Massachusetts.") (Noonan, J., 
dissenting); Nelson v. Farrey, 874 F.2d 1222, 1224 (7th Cir. 1989) ("A growing 
sensitivity to the prevalence of child abuse in our society has caused an upsurge of 
prosecutions. . . . Such prosecutions place a strain on traditional notions of procedural 
justice." (citations omitted)). 
Frequently-cited abuses include false accusations, poorly trained professionals, 
overzealous prosecutors, and procedural shortcuts. See State v. Michaels, 136 N.J. 299, 
320, 642 A.2d 1372, 1382-83 (1994) (ordering a pretrial taint hearing to protect the 
defendants against false accusations); People v. Pitts, 223 Cal. App. 3d 606,690,273 
Cal. Rptr. 757,807 (Ct. App. 1990) (recanting the false accusations of child abuse and 
overturning the convictions); see also STEPHEN J. CECI & MAGGIE BRUCK, JEOPARDY 
IN THE COURTROOM: A SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY (1995) 
(discussing the many issues surrounding child testimony). 
See infia notes 61-70 and accompanying text. 
' See infia notes 53-60 and accompanying text. 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused the right "to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him." U.S.CONST. amendV1;seeCoy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012,1015, 
108 S. Ct. 2798, 2800, 101 L. Ed. 2d 857, 863 (1988) (interpreting constitutional 
guarantee to require face-to-face confiontation). State constitutions oftenemploy much 
more demanding language, requiring a literal right to meet one's accuser face-to-face. 
See, e.g., Peoplev. Fitzpatrick, 158111.2d360,365,633 N.E.Zd685,688,198 Ill. Dec. 
844,847 (1994); Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 534,553,524 N.E.2d 366, 
377 (1988); Commonwealthv. Ludwig, 527 Pa. 472,480,594 A.2d 281,285 (1991). 
'See infia notes 3 1-37 and accompanying text. 
See infia notes 45-52 and accompanying text. 
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procedure. In addition, several jurisdictions have enacted statutes that 
create new hearsay exceptions for out-of-court statements by children that 
arguablyjeopardize the defendant's constitutional right to confi-ontation 
and a fair trial.' 
Additionally, the numerous reversals of convictions based on the 
tainted testimony of child witnesses has generated widespread concern 
about the inherent reliability of such testimony.' A very young child 
initially must be found by a court to be sufficiently competent to give 
te~timony.~ Indeed, the testimony of children as young as four and five 
years old has been found sufficiently reliable such that a jury may 
properly use the testimony to draw ultimate conclusions of guilt or 
innocence. Finally, the jury's capacity to judge the credibility of child 
witnesses has been impeded by the increased use of experts in child abuse 
cases who often give testimony that improperly enhances the child's 
credibility.'' The ability of prosecutors to use experts in an attempt to 
bolster the child's testimony introduces the danger that a jury will accept 
opinions by highly respected professionals as an endorsement or valida- 
tion of the child's allegations. 
11. Testimonial Capacity of Young Children 
The increased attention given to child sexual abuse and the rights of 
child victims and child witnesses has required trial courts to carefully 
scrutinize whether very young children are sufficiently competent to give 
' See infia notes 7 1-95 and accompanying text. 
"See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98,114,97 S. Ct. 2243,2253,53 L. Ed. 
2d 140, 154 (1977) (concluding that "reliability is the linchpin in determining the 
admissibility of [a witness's] identification testimony for both pre- and post-Stovall 
confrontations"); see also Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D. Friedman, The Suggestibility 
of Children: Scient$c Research and Legal Implications, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 33,34 
(2000) (stating that "scholars agree that young children are more susceptible than older 
individuals to leading questions and pressures to conform to the expectations and desires 
of others"). 
See infia notes 11-30 and accompanying text. 
'O See infia notes 96-1 13 and accompanying text. 
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testimony. '' The general rule is that the question of a witness's compe- 
tency is a matter for the trial judge because the judge has the best 
opportunity determine first-hand whether the witness has the capacity to 
give meaningful testimony. l2  The failure of a court to make a sufficiently 
thorough exploration of a child's testimonial capacity when warranted 
by the circumstances implicates constitutional guarantees.13 
There are no rigid rules that address the competency of young children 
to give testimony.14 Competency is determined on a case-by-case basis, 
and courts possess extremely broad discretion in making the determina- 
tion.'' A child is presumed to be a competent witness unless the court 
finds otherwise, and there is no minimum age below which a child is 
presumed to be incapable oftestifjhg.16 Indeed, children as young as four 
and five years old have been found competent to give testimony.I7 As 
' 
' I  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. 5 3509 (West 2000) (stating that the "Child Victims' Rights 
Act" provides various procedural and evidentiary protections for child witnesses). 
l2 See, e.g., Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523, 524-25, 16 S. Ct. 93,93-94, 
40 L. Ed. 244, 246 (1895) (stating that the question of child's competency "rests 
primarily with the trial judge, who sees the proposed witness, notices his manner, his 
apparent possession or lack of intelligence, and may resort to any examination which 
will tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence, as well as his understanding of the 
obligations of an oath"). 
" See, e.g., State v. Michaels, 136 N.J. 299, 3 19, 642 A.2d 1372, 1382 (1994) 
(holding that pretrial taint hearing is required to determine whether the testimony of a 
young child meets standards of reliability as required by due process). 
l4 The Federal Rules of Evidence provide: "Every person is competent to be a 
witness except as otherwise provided. . . ." FED. R. EVD. 601. There is no separate 
provision for determining the competency of young children. 
l 5  See, e.g., Blume v. State, 797 P.2d 664,668 (Alaska 1990); Commonwealth v. 
Allen, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 458, 461, 665 N.E.2d 105, 108 (App. Ct. 1996); 
Commonwealth v. Pankraz, 382 Pa. Super. 116, 122, 554 A.2d 974, 977 (Super. Ct. 
1989). 
l6 See 18 U.S.C.A. 5 3509(c)(1) (West 2000) (stating that "[a] child is presumed to 
be competent"); Wheeler, 159 U.S. at 524 (stating that "there is no precise age which 
determines the question ofcompetency"); Walters v. McCormick, 122 F.3d 1 172,1176 
(9th Cir. 1997) (stating that "[nlo federal court has held that the Constitution places 
limits on allowing even the youngest child to testify at trial"); Blume, 797 P.2d at 668 
(stating that "there is no minimum age below which a child is presumed incompetent 
to testify" (citations omitted)); Pankraz, 554 A.2d at 977 (stating that "[a] witness is 
presumed competent to testify unless proven otherwise"). 
17 See, e.g., Walters, 122 F.3d at 1 174 (four-year-old child); United States v. Wright, 
119 F.3d 630,632 (8th Cir. 1997) (four-year-old child); United States v. Rouse, 11 1 
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with all witnesses, the court must determine that the child possesses 
sufficient cognitive capacity to observe the occurrence, to remember the 
subject matter about which the child is called upon to testify, to under- 
stand the examiner's questions, to frame intelligent responses, and to be 
conscious ofthe obligation to tell the truth.'* There is no requirement that 
a child must take an oath to testify truthfully as a precondition to giving 
testimony,I9 although in some jurisdictions a child's unsworn testimony 
may require corroboration before it is legally sufficient to convict.20 
A child's capacity to understand the significance of telling the truth 
is a source of some di~agreement.~' When a question of a child's 
F.3d 561,568 (8th Cir. 1997) (five-year-old child); Sexton v. Howard, 55 F.3d 1557, 
1558-59 (1 1th Cir. 1995) (five-year-old child); Blume, 797 P.2d at 666 (five-year-old 
child); Ricketts v. State, 498N.E.2d 1222,1223 (Ind. 1986) (five-year-oldchild); State 
v. Jacques, 558 A.2d 706,707 (Me. 1989) (five-year-old child); State v. Conklin, 444 
N.W.2d 268,269-70 (Minn. 1989) (four-year-old child); People v. Groff, 71 N.Y.2d 
101, 104, 518 N.E.2d 908, 909, 524 N.Y.S.2d 13, 14 (1987) (four-year-old child); 
Pankraz, 554 A.2d at 975 (four-year-old child). 
l 8  See Commonwealth v. Hart, 501 Pa. 174,177,460 A.2d 745,747 (1983). 
l9 The Federal Rules of Evidence require that every witness either take an oath or 
affirm that he will testifL truthfully. FED. R. Evm. 603. The advisory committee's note 
to Rule 603 observes that ''the rule is designed to afford the flexibility required in dealing 
with religious adults, atheists, conscientious objectors, mental defectives, and children." 
Id. (advisory committee's notes). The Note further explains that an "[a]ffirmation is 
simply a solemn undertaking to tell the truth; no special verbal formula is required." Id. 
*'See, e.g., N.Y. C m .  PROC. LAW 5 60.20(3) (McKinney 2001) (noting that a 
defendant may not be convicted "solely upon unsworn evidence"). Corroborative 
evidence is legally sufficient if it tends to establish the commission of the crime and that 
the defendant is connected with its commission. See People v. Groff, 71 N.Y.2d 101, 
104,518 N.E.2d 908,909,524 N.Y.S.2d 13,14 (1987). 
Arguably, a child who lacks sufficient understanding of the concept of truth or the 
obligation to testify truthfully cannot be meaningfully cross-examined consistent with 
the sixth~rnend&nt's confi~ntationre~uirement. compare Walters, 122 F.3d at 1 175 
(finding no constitutional violation although child witness "may not have understood 
the oath she took"); Blume, 797 P.2dat 668 n.4 (stating that "[alnabstract understanding 
of the significance of the oath or of the concept of truthfulness is thus unnecessary so 
long as a child understands the need to testify candidly" (relying on Sevier v. State, 6 14 
P.2d 791, 794 (Alaska 1980)); and Grog 518 N.E.2d at 909 (involving a child who 
stated that she did not know the difference between telling the truth and telling a lie and 
was permitted to give unsworn testimony), with Walters, 122 F.3d at 11 82 (contending 
that ''[bJecause she did not know what truth-telling is she was not a witness within the 
meaning of the Sixth Amendment. . . [and] could not be subjected to cross-examination 
within the meaning ofthe Sixth Amendment.") (Noonan, J., dissenting); Seccia v. State, 
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competency is raised, a trial judge typically will examine the child in the 
jury's presence.22 When compelling reasons exist, however, a court may 
be required to conduct an evidentiary hearing outside the jury's presence 
to determine the child's fitness to t e ~ t i f l . ~ ~  The procedures at a pre- 
testimonial competency examination are tailored to enable the court to 
ascertain whether the child can answer simple questions.24 The judge 
typically conducts much ofthe examination, and the attorneys may submit 
questions or question the child directly. The court may also question 
other witnesses, particularly experts who may have interviewed the 
Some courts have required a pretrial "taint" hearing when a sufficient 
showing has been made that the child's capacity to give reliable testimony 
has been impaired by coercive or suggestive interviewing techniques.26 
In State v. Michaels, the New Jersey Supreme Court outlined the factors 
that should be considered in determining whether a child's competency 
689 So. 2d 354, 356 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that '"knowing the difference 
between the truth and a lie does not impute a moral obligation or sense of duty to be 
trutfil"') (quoting Wade v. State, 586 So. 2d 1200,1204 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)). 
22 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Allen, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 458,460,665 N.E.2d 105, 
107 (App. Ct. 1996). 
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. $3509(c) (West 2000); Walters, 122 F.3d at 1 176; Blume, 
797 P.2d at 667; Commonwealth v. Pankraz, 382 Pa. Super. 116,554 A.2d 974,978 
(Super. Ct. 1989). 
24 18 U.S.C.A. $3509(c)(8) (West 2000) (stating that "[tlhe questions asked at the 
competency examination of a child shall be appropriate to the age and developmental 
level ofthe child, shall not be related to the issues at trial, and shall focus on determining 
the child's ability to understand and answer simple questions"). 
25 See, e.g., Blume, 797 P.2d at 667. The extent to which the defense may interview 
young child victims prior to trial may depend on whether the child is in the custody of 
a social services agency. See United States v. Rouse, 11 1 F.3d 561,566 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(finding "[wlhen a child witness is in the legal custody of a social services agency, that 
agency as custodian may refuse requests for pretrial interviews" (citations omitted)). 
26 See, e.g., State v. Michaels, 136 N.J. 299, 306, 642 A.2d 1372, 1375 (1994) 
(noting that, "[llike confessions and identification, the inculpatory capacity of statements 
indicating the occurrence of sexual abuse and the anticipated testimony about those 
occurrences requires that special care be taken to ensure their reliability"); Allen, 665 
N.E.2d at 108 (assuming the propriety of pretrial taint hearing and recognizing that the 
defendant's offer of proof that the victim's statements were the product of suggestive 
or coercive interview techmques is insufficient to trigger the need for a hearing). 
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or testimonial reliability is the product of coercive or suggestive pretrial 
interviewing techniques.*' The court determined that such factors include 
"the absence of spontaneous recall, interviewer bias, repeated leading 
questions, multiple interviews, incessant questioning, vilification of [the] 
defendant, ongoing contact with peers and references to their statements, 
and the use of threats, bribes, and cajoling, as well as the failure to 
videotape or otherwise document the initial interview  session^."^^ 
Defense experts have been permitted to testify'at trial regarding 
suggestive or coercive interviewing methods and techniques employed 
upon child victims.29 Furthermore, the exclusion of such testimony may 
be deemed reversible error.30 
111. Physical Obstructions to 
Face-to-Face Confrontation 
Various obstructions to face-to-face confiontation-including screens, 
courtroom seating arrangements, and closed-circuit television-have been 
employed ostensibly to protect the child witness fiom being traumatized 
by having to look at the defendant. Yet, in Coy v. Iowa, the Supreme 
Court struck down a state procedure that permitted child witnesses in sex- 
ual abuse cases to testify with a screen placed between the defendant and 
l7 136 N.J. 299,321,642 A.2d 1372, 1383 (1994). 
Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1383; seealso Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805,826-27,110 
S. Ct. 3 139,3 152,111 L. Ed. 2d638,659 (1990) (finding that, althoughthe Constitution 
does not impose any fixed set ofprocedural safeguards on interview process, the totality 
of the circumstances surrounding a child's responses to an examining physician's 
questions are not sufficiently trustworthy to qualify as a hearsay exception in view of 
the leading questions, manipulation, and prompting by the interrogator). 
29 See Wright, 497 U.S. at 812-13; United States v. Rouse, 11 1 F.3d 561, 570-71 
(8th Cir. 1997); State v. Hulbert, 48 1 N.W.2d 329,33 1 (Iowa 1992); People v. Alvarez, 
607 N.Y.S.2d 573, 574, 159 Misc. 2d 963, 965 (Crim. Ct. 1993); see also State v. 
Gersin, 76 Ohio St. 3d 491, 494, 668 N.E.2d 486, 488 (1996) (describing special 
interviewing protocols used to elicit information fiom child victims who are immature, 
frightened, or confused). 
'O See State v. Malarney, 617 So. 2d 739,740 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); State v. 
Sloan, 912 S.W.2d 592,596 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). Butseeunited States v. Rouse, 11 1 
F.3d 561,572 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding harmless error). 
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the accusing witness based on a statutorypresumption that the screen was 
necessary to protect the child from the traumatic effect of testifying in 
~our t .~ '  The large screen blocked the defendant from the witness's view 
but allowed the defendant to dimly observe the witness.32 The Court 
found that this procedure violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right 
to face-to-face confrontation." Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, em- 
phasized the "irreducible literal meaning" of the Sixth Amendment which 
"'[s]imply as a matter of English' . . . confers at least 'a right to meet face 
to face all those who appear and give evidence at trial."'34 Moreover, to 
the extent that any exceptions to the defendant's literal right to confront 
witnesses might be available, the generalized legislative presumption of 
harm necessitating the screen did not create such an e~ception.~' 
Trial courts have occasionally authorized changes in courtroom seating 
arrangements so that the child witness would be shielded from having to 
look directly at the defendant's face.36 Although such procedures argu- 
ably impinge on the defendant's confrontation rights, courts have held 
either that the procedure is not error or, more likely, that the violation is 
harmle~s.~' 
487 U.S. 1012,1020-21,108 S. Ct. 2798,2803,101 L. Ed. 2d 857,862 (1988). 
32 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1014-15. 
33 Id. at 1020-2 1. 
34 Id. at 1016(quotingCaliforniav. Green, 339U.S. 149,175,90 S. Ct. 1930,1943- 
44,26 L. Ed. 2d489,505 (1970)). The Court observed that the screen "was specifically 
designed to enable the complaining witnesses to avoid viewing appellant as they gave 
their testimony." Id. at 1020. As the Court noted, "[ilt is difficult to imagine a more ob- 
vious or damaging violation of the defendant's right to a face-to-face encounter." Id. 
'' Id. The concurring opinion of Justice O'Comor, joined by Justice White, sugges- 
ted that when a trial court makes a "case-specific finding of necessity . . . [where] the 
strictures of the Confrontation Clause may give way to the compelling state interest of 
protecting child witnesses." Id. at 1025 (citations omitted). The use ofscreens to shield 
a child witness from a defendant is probably pennissible under Coy. See Maryland v. 
Craig, 497U.S. 836,855,110 S. Ct. 3157,3169,111 L. Ed. 2d666,682 (1990) (stating 
that a court must make particularized findings as to the necessity of such procedure). 
36See, e.g., People v. Sema, 2 14 Cal. App. 3d 229,262 Cal. Rptr. 602,604 (Ct. App. 
1989); Commonwealth v. Arnirault, 424 Mass. 618,653,677 N.E.2d 652,674 (1997). 
"See Serna, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 604; Amirault, 677 N.E.2d at 674. 
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IV. Accompanying Adult Attendants 
Child witnesses have the right to be accompanied by an adult attendant 
to lend emotional support to the child.38 The adult attendant is allowed 
to remain in close physical proximity to the child, to hold the child's 
hand, and to have the child sit on the attendant's lap throughout the course 
of the testimony.39 The adult attendant is forbidden to assist the child in 
answering questions or otherwise prompt the child, and the presence of 
the attendant must be recorded on vide~tape.~ Although no particularized 
showing is necessary to permit an adult attendant to accompany a child, 
the image of a child sitting on an adult's lap may be so inherentlyprejudi- 
cia1 that some showing of necessity may be requirede4' 
The danger of the accompanying adult attendant vouching for the 
child's credibility is always present. For example, accompaniment by 
an adult attendant known to the jury as a victim's rights counselor may 
implicitly vouch for the child's ~redibility?~ and may be far more 
prejudicial than accompaniment by a parent or relative.43 In an extreme 
38 See 18 U.S.C.A. 5 3509(i) (West 2000). Statutes in several states similarly 
authorize such accompaniment to include a parent, counselor, or other attendant 
designated by the court. See, e.g., Sexton v. Howard, 55 F.3d 1557, 1559 (1 1 th Cir. 
1995); Commonwealthv. Pankraz, 382 Pa. Super. 1 16,127,554 A.2d 974,980 (Super. 
Ct. 1989); State v. Jones, 178 W. Va. 519,521,362 S.E.2d 330,332 (1987). 
39 See 18 U.S.C.A. 5 3509(i) (West 2000). Importantly, a court has broad discretion 
to allow such contact. Id. 
Id. 
4' See State v. Rulona, 71 Haw. 127, 130,785 P.2d 615,617 (1990) (stating that, 
"[elven if we assume that the court had the discretion to do so, there is nothing in the 
minor witness' testimony. . . which shows a compelling necessity for allowing such a 
prejudicial scenario"). 
" See State v. Suka, 70 Haw. 472,476 n.l,777 P.2d 240,242 n. 1 (1989) (noting 
that an accompaniment by parent or guardian is less prejudicial than accompaniment 
by victim or witness counselor who more likely may be seen as vouching for the 
witness's credibility) (overruled in part on othergrounds by State v. Holbron, 80 Haw. 
27,904 P.2d 912 (1995)). 
43 See Pankraz, 554 A.2d at 980 n.6 (finding that it was not prejudicial to allow a 
child to testify while sitting in her grandmother's lap); Jones, 362 S.E.2d at 332 (finding 
no evidence of prejudice to the defendant when the court allowed the child to testify 
while seated in her foster mother's lap); cf: Ricketts v. State, 498 N.E.2d 1222, 1223 
(Ind. 1986) (finding that a mother's entry into the courtroom to calm the five-year-old 
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example of the misuse of this procedure, a state prosecutor questioned 
the child while the child was seated on the prosecutor's lap, and then 
interjected helpfbl cues while the child remained seated on the prosecu- 
tor's lap during cross-exa~nination.~~ 
V. Restriction on Cross-Examination 
A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confiont his accuser includes 
not only the right to physically face his accu~er,"~ but also the right of 
cross-e~amination.~~ Although limitations on cross-examination do not 
necessarily infringe upon a defendant's right of confrontation,"' preclusion 
by a court of an entire relevant area of cross-examination may constitute 
a violation.48 
A court may likely find the limitations on the cross-examination of 
a child sexual abuse victim more constitutionally acceptable than a similar 
child and advise her that it was proper to touch a doll where the defendant had touched 
her is permissible). 
"See Sextonv. Howard, 55 F.3d 1557,1558 (1 1thCir. 1995) (stating that, although 
the court "caution[s] prosecutors to refiain from similar actions in the future," such 
conduct did not prejudice defendant's right to fair trial). 
45SeeCoyv. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012,1016,108 S. Ct. 2798,2801,101 L. Ed. 2d 857, 
864 (1988). 
46 See Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730,736,107 S. Ct. 2658,2662,96 L. Ed. 2d 
63 1,64 1 (1 987) (stating that cross-examination "is critical for ensuring the integrity of 
the fact-f111ding process" and "is 'the principal means by which the believability of a 
witness and the truth of his testimony are tested"' (citations omitted)). 
47 See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,684, 106 S. Ct. 143 1,1438,89 
L. Ed. 2d 674,684 (1 986) (explaining that, in order to determine whether the restriction 
was error or whether the error was harmless, the court should examine ''the importance 
of the witness' testimony. . ., whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or 
absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on 
material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and. . . the overall 
strength of the prosecution's case"); State v. Wiley, 676 A.2d 321, 324 (R.I. 1996) 
(holding that restrictions on the extensive cross-examination of a child into prior acts 
of misconduct are not violative of the confrontation clause). 
48 See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,320,94 S. Ct. 1105, 11 12,39 L. Ed. 2d 
347,355 (1974) (holding that a state's interest in protecting a juvenile offender does 
not take precedence over the defendant's right to cross-examine the witness on bias); 
United States v. Lonedog, 929 F.2d 568, 570 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting that it is 
constitutional error to preclude an entire line of cross-examination). 
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limitation of an adult's testimony in a non-sexual abuse case. First, 
evidence of a victim's past sexual activity is generally excluded by rape 
shield laws in effect in virtually everyj~risdiction.~~ Second, courts have 
interpreted confiontation requirements somewhat less stringently with 
respect to child witnes~es.'~ Nevertheless, because "[tlhe central concern 
of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence 
against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing,"" any 
ruling that significantlyrestricts cross-examination of a child witness into 
relevant areas, absent any showing of necessity, is presumptively 
unconstituti~nal.~~ 
VI. Videotaped Testimony 
The use of alternatives to live in-court testimony of children is 
increasingly being employed. One method progressively used is the 
videotaping of child witness testimony. Videotaped depositions are seen 
as balancing the defendant's constitutional right to confiont his accuser 
with the state's interest in protecting vulnerable children fiom the 
traumatic experience of live courtroom testimony. When a proper 
showing has been made that a child would suffer mental or emotional 
distress fiom testifying in open court,s3 the court may order that the 
49 See FED. R. Evm. 412. The guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are also 
subordinated to discovery requirements. Thus, in Michigan v. Lucas, the Supreme Court 
overturned a court of appeals finding that it is unconstitutional under the Sixth 
Amendment to preclude a defendant from offering evidence of a victim's prior sexual 
conduct with the defendant based on a defendant's violation of a discovery rule. 500 
U.S. 145, 152-53,111 S. Ct. 1743,1748, 114 L. Ed. 2d 205,214-15 (1991); see also 
United States v. Rouse, 11 1 F.3d 561, 569 (8th Cir. 1997) (upholding the preclusion 
of evidence of arguably relevant proof of past sexual conduct for failure to give timely 
notice). 
"See, e.g., Marylandv. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3165, 111 L. 
Ed. 2d 666,672 (1990); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596,607,102 
S. Ct. 2613, 2620,73 L. Ed. 2d 248, 255 (1982); Wiley, 676 A.2d at 324. 
'' Craig, 497 U.S. at 845. 
'' See, e.g., United States v. Begay, 937 F.2d 515, 523 (10th Cir. 1991); State v. 
Jacques, 558 A.2d 706,708 (Me. 1989); State v. Reinart, 440N.W.2d 503,506 (N.D. 
1989). 
'' Such a finding may be based on the court's own observations and questioning of 
the child. There is no requirement that an expert support the court's determination. See 
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child's deposition be taken prior to trial and preserved by videotape for 
possible use at trial in lieu of the child's live te~tirnony.'~ Statutes 
typically specify the persons who may be present at the deposition," as 
well as the procedures that must be followed to ensure that the defen- 
dant's constitutional rights are pr~tected.'~ Appellate courts have reversed 
convictions when the trial courts admitted videotaped depositions under 
statutes that fail to comply with constitutional standards." Such statutes 
United Statesv. Rouse, 1 1 1 F.3d 561,569 (8thCir. 1997) (statingthat the federal statute 
"does not require an expert to support a 'because of fear' finding"); State v. Crandall, 
120N.J. 649,662,577 A.2d483,489 (1990) (finding "the vast majority ofjurisdictions 
. . . have concluded that expert testimony is not necessarily required to justify use of the 
statutory procedure"). 
" See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. 5 3509(b)(2) (West 2000) (authorizing the videotaped 
deposition when a child is likely to be unable to testify in open court because of fear, 
emotional trauma, mental or other infirmity, or conduct by the defendant or defense 
counsel). Videotaped depositions are allowed in some instances when the witness is 
unavailable. See, e.g., United Statesv. Mueller, 74 F.3d 1152,1156-57 (1 1thCir. 1996) 
(finding the deposition of a foreign witness admissible and not violative of the 
confiontationclause); United States v. Kelly, 892 F.2d 255,261 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding 
the videotaped deposition of a foreign witness admissible because the witness was 
unavailable if the deposition "contains sufficient 'indicia of reliability"'). But see Lam 
v. Iowa, 860 F.2d 873,875 (8thCir. 1988) (concluding that the admission ofavideotape 
ofthe witness's deposition was error because of an insufficient shqwing that the witness's 
presence could not be obtained at trial). 
'' See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. 5 3509(b)(l)(D) (West 2000) (stating that such persons 
include a judicial officer appointed by the court, the child, the prosecutor, defense 
counsel, the child's attorney or guardian ad litem, persons necessary to operate the 
videotape equipment, and other persons who may be necessary to insure the child's 
welfare). 
"See 18 U.S.C.A. $3509(b)(2)(vi) (West 2000) (stating that "[tlhe defendant shall 
be afforded the rights applicable to defendants during trial, including the right to an 
attorney, the right to be confronted with the witness against the defendant, and the right 
to cross-examine the child"); see also State v. Marquis, 241 Corn. 823,825,699 A.2d 
893,895 (1997) (concluding that the court has the authority to order that the child first 
be examined by an expert for the defense before deciding whether to grant the 
prosecutor's motion for videotaped testimony). 
'' See Lowery v. Collins, 988 F.2d 1364, 1368 (5th Cir. 1993) (fmding t h t  the 
admission of an exparte videotaped interview without any showing ofnecessity violates 
the defendant's confkontation rights despite the defendant's ability to call and examine 
the child at trial because "forcing a defendant to call a child complainant to tes- in 
order to cross-examine that individual creates a risk of inflaming the jury against a 
criminal defendant and also unfairly requires a defendant to choose between his right 
to cross-examine a complaining witness and his right to rely on the State's burden of 
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violate the confrontation rights of defendants by permitting ex parte 
videotaped statements to be admitted without any showing of need and 
without contemporaneous cross-examir~ation.~~ Statutes, although facially 
constitutional, may also be applied in a manner that violates a defendant's 
constitutional confrontation rights.59 For example, child abuse statutes 
that permit videotaped depositions based on individualized findings of 
necessity will most likely satis@ constitutional  mandate^.^' 
VII. Closed-Circuit Television 
Another alternative to live in-court testimony is the use of closed- 
circuit television to telecast the testimony of a child witness. Closed- 
circuit television may be used if the court finds that there is a substantial 
likelihood that the child would suffer mental or emotional distress if 
proofina criminal case" (citations omitted)); State v. Taylor, 196Ariz. 584,588,2 P.3d 
674,678 (Ct. App. 2000) (finding a statute that authorized videotaped statements to be 
unconstitutional and infiinging on the judiciary's powers); State v. Bastien, 129 Ill. 2d 
64,67,541 N.E.2d 670,676,133 Ill. Dec. 459,465 (1989) (finding a statute allowing 
ex parte videotaped testimony unconstitutional as denying the defendant a right to 
contemporaneous cross-examination); State v. Pilkey, 776 S.W.2d 943,948 (Tenn. 1989) 
(holding unconstitutional a statute that allows the ex parte videotaped statement of a 
child when either party may call the child as a witness and stating, ''the effect is that the 
State may produce evidence in chief by an unsworn witness, and the accused is then 
forced to call the child, if desired, as a witness for direct examination"). 
See Bastien, 541 N.E.2d at 675 (finding ex parte videotaped statements are in 
effect hearsay evidence and, in the absence ofcontemporaneous cross-examination, they 
present a danger that the child's statements will "'harden and become unyielding"' even 
in the face of subsequent cross-examination) (quoting State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 
362,285 N.W. 898,901 (1939)). 
'' See State v. Vincent, 159 Ariz. 418,432,768 P.2d 150, 164 (1989) (stating that 
a videotaped deposition conducted in the defendant's absence without any individualized 
showing of necessity for protection violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
conflontation). But see Thomas v. Gunter, 962 F.2d 1477, 1484 (10th Cir. 1992) 
(determining videotaped depositions taken outside the defendant's physical presence 
were not violative of the defendant's confrontation rights where particularized findings 
were made that the children would be unable to testify when seeing the defendant in 
court); State v. Thomas, 150 Wis. 2d 374,393,442 N.W.2d l0,19-20 (1989) (finding 
videotaped deposition where child could not see defendant upheld based on 
individualized showing of need for protection). 
See, e.g., State v. Spigarolo, 210 COM. 359,365,556 A.2d 1 12,117-18 (1989); 
Glendening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212,219 (Fla. 1988). 
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required to testifL in open court.61 In Malyland v. Craig, the Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of a statutory procedure permitting a 
victim of child abuse to testify at trial outside the presence of the judge, 
jury, and defendant, via one-way closed-circuit tele~ision.~' The statute 
required the judge to determine that the child's courtroom testimony 
would result in the child suffering serious emotional distress so that the 
child would be unable to reasonably co~nrnunicate.~~ 
Face-to-face confiontation, the Court emphasized in Craig, "is not the 
sine qua non of the confiontation right."64 The Court listed three findings 
6' See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836,853-54,110 S. Ct. 3157,3167-68,111 L. 
Ed. 2d 666,683-84 (1990) (noting that twenty-four states allow the use of one-way 
closed-circuit television testimony and eight states use a two-way system under which 
the child-witness can view the courtroom and the defendant on a video monitor while 
the jury, judge, and defendant can view the child during testimony); United States v. 
Weekley, 130 F.3d 747, 752-54 (6th Cir. 1997) (allowing closed-circuit televised 
testimony supported by an expert's testimony and the court's in camera questioning of 
child); State v. Smith, 158 N.J. 376,385-87,730 A.2d 3 11,3 17-18 (1999) (finding the 
use ofclosed-circuit television is not limited to situations where that child fears testifying 
in presence of defendant but is permitted when child's fears stem from courtroom 
atmosphere or presence of jury); see also United States v. Gigante, 971 F. Supp. 755, 
758-59 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (allowing in a case of first impression, the government, in a 
RICO prosecution in which its chief witness was too ill to testify in court, to have the 
witness's testimony taken through closed-circuit television). The two-way closed-circuit 
television system is used in the federal child witness statute. See 18 U.S.C.A. 5 
3509(b)(l) (West 2000). 
" 497 U.S. 836, 851-55, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3166-69, 11 1 L. Ed. 2d 666, 682-85 
(1990). 
Craig, 497 U.S. at 842 (citing MD. CODE ANN., 0 s .  & JUD. PROC. 9- 
102(a)(l)(ii) (1989)). The state presented expert testimony suggesting that the child 
abuse victims would have considerable difficultly testifymg in front of the defendant. 
Id. However, expert testimony is not necessary to justify the use of a closed-circuit 
television procedure. See, e.g., United States v. Rouse, 11 1 F.3d 561, 569 (8th Cir. 
1997) (noting that the federal statute does not require expert testimony); State v. 
Crandall, 120 N.J. 649,662,577 A.2d 483,489 (1990) (stating that a vast majority of 
jurisdictions have concluded that expert testimony is not necessary). 
Craig, 497 U.S. at 847 (citing Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15,22, 106 S. Ct. 
292,295,88 L. Ed. 2d 15,21 (1985)). The Court stated that the "central concern of 
the Codiontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal 
defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding 
before the trier of fact." Id. at 845. The Court further emphasized that the right to face- 
to-face confrontation may be denied only when it "is necessary to further an important 
public policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured." Id. 
at 850 (citing Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012,1021,108 S. Ct. 2798,2803,101 L. Ed. 2d 
857, 867 (1988)). 
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that a trial court must make before allowing closed-circuit television 
te~timony.~' First, a court must hear the evidence and determine whether 
the use of a one-way closed-circuit television procedure is necessary to 
protect the child's welfare.66 Second, the court must find that the child 
would be traumatized not by the courtroom but by the defendant.67 Third, 
the court must find that the emotional distress suffered by the child is not 
"de minimis, i.e., more than 'mere nervousness or excitement or some 
reluctance to testify. ,9968 
Convictions have been set aside based on insufficient findings that the 
televised procedure is necessary to protect the welfare of a vulnerable 
witness.69 Moreover, since the closed-circuit television procedure 
separates the defendant from his attorney, a court must ensure that the 
defendant will be provided with the means of private, contemporaneous 
communication with his attorney during the witness's te~timony.~' 
Id. at 855-56. 
Id. at 855. 
67 Id. at 856. 
Id. at 856 (quoting Wildennuth v. State, 3 10 Md. 496,524,530 A.2d 275,289 
(1987)); seealso People v. Cintron, 75 N.Y.2d 249,263,55 1 N.E.2d 561,569-70,552 
N.Y.S.2d 68,76-77 (1990) (noting that the determinationmust be based on something 
more than subjective impressions of trial judge); People v. Henderson, 554 N.Y.S.2d 
924,928-29, 156 A.D.2d 92,99-101 (App. Div. 1990) (finding the vulnerability and 
necessity of procedure based on the testimony of a social worker not supported by 
sufficient evidence). The federal statute provides that the two-way closed-circuit 
television procedure may be employed when the judge finds that the emotional or mental 
impact on the child "is so substantial as to justify an order." 18 U.S.C.A. 5 
3509(b)(l)(C) (West 2000). 
69SeeUnited States v. Moses, 137 F.3d 894,898 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding reversible 
error to allow a child to testify by closed-circuit television because of an insufficient 
showing that child was fearful of the defendant and the lack of the qualifications of a 
social worker to give an opinion that the child would suffer trauma if she testified); State 
v. Bray, 342 S.C. 23,29,535 S.E.2d 636,639-40 (2000) (concluding that the trial court 
failed to determine fiomstrong, specific, and persuasive evidence that the child was too 
afraid of the defendant to testify in an open court and that forcing such testimony would 
cause the child to suffer irreparable harm). 
For other cases finding reversible error, see Curnbie v. Singletary, 991 F.2d 715, 
722-23 (1 lth Cir. 1993); Cintron, 551 N.E.2d at 571-72; Henderson, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 
929. 
70 See Craig, 497 U.S. at 842 (noting statute requires mandating instantaneous 
communication between the defendant and his counsel during a witness's testimony); 
State v. Warford, 223 Neb. 368,377,389 N.W.2d575,581-82 (1986) (statingthat, "[alt 
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VIII. Hearsay Evidence 
Courts have increasingly resorted to the admission of out-of-court 
statements of young children to prove the defendant's guilt.'' Tradition- 
ally rooted  exception^,'^ residual  exception^:^ and newly enacted 
exceptions for out-of-court statements by young children have been 
invoked to support adrni~sibility.~~ Such evidence is often highly 
the very least, the defendant must at all times have a means of communicating with his 
attorneys"). 
The federal statute mandates that the trial judge provide the defendant and his counsel 
with the means of private, contemporaneous communication. See 18 U.S.C.A. 
3509(b)(l)(D)(iv) (West 2000); seealso United Statesv. Miguel, 1 1 1 F.3d 666,670-71 
(9th Cir. 1997) (refusing to provide instantaneous communication with counsel but error 
was harmless); Myles v. State, 602 So. 2d 1278,1280 (Fla. 1992) (reversing conviction 
where the trial court failed to provide an effective means of contemporaneous 
communication between the defendant and his attorney). 
Plainly, an electronic method of communication such as a telephonic hookup or a 
walkie-talkie system should be available to ensure private and instantaneous 
communication. An oral relay system using court bailiffs to deliver messages was 
condemned in Myles, as inflinging upon the attorney-client privilege. Myles, 602 So. 
2d at 1280. 
7' See, e.g., United States v. Rouse, 11 1 F.3d 561,569-70 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting 
"'a formidable line of Circuit precedent that sanctions the use of hearsay testimony in 
child sexual abuse cases"' (quoting United States v. St. John, 85 1 F.2d 1096,1098 (8th 
Cir. 1988)); Nelson v. Farrey, 874 F.2d 1222, 1229 (7th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that 
"[tlhe question is whether allowing the statements into evidence create[s] a serious 
danger of a miscarriage ofjustice"); see also United States v. Eagle, 137 F.3d 101 1, 
1015 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that a notice of intent to offer such statements fails to 
provide sufficient details but is not plain error). 
72 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,356-57, 112 S. Ct. 736,743, 116 L. Ed. 2d 
848,859 (1992) (discussing the admissibility of the spontaneous declaration and medical 
examination exceptions to the hearsay rule). 
73SeeIdaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805,817-18,110 S. Ct. 3139,3147-48,111 L. Ed. 
2d 638,653-54 (1990) (discussing the admissibility of the out-of-court statement of a 
child under the state's residual exception equivaient of Federal Rule of Evidence 
803(24)). 
74 See, e.g., People v. McClure, 779 P.2d 864,865-67 (Colo. 1989); Perez v. State, 
536 So. 2d 206, 209 (Fla. 1988); State v. Pendleton, 10 Kan. App. 2d 26,28-32, 690 
P.2d 959,962-64 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Ryan, 103 Wash. 2d 165,169-70,691 P.2d 
197,201-02 (1984). 
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reliable.75 On the other hand, absent contemporaneous adversarial truth- 
testing, such evidence often "poses too serious a threat to the accuracy 
of the verdict to be countenanced by the Sixth ~rnendrnent."~~ 
In Idaho v.  right,'^ the Supreme Court held that out-of-court 
statements by a three-year-old child to an examining pediatrician were 
unreliable and erroneously admitted into evidence at trial.78 The Court 
found "no special reason for supposing that the incriminating statements 
about the child's own abuse were particularly trust~orthy."~~ The 
statements were made under "blatantly" suggestive interviewing tech- 
n i q u e ~ . ~ ~  To overcome the presumption of inadmissibility of such 
75 See Nelson, 874 F.2d at 1229 (noting that "it appears that children rarely fabricate 
reports of sexual abuse" (citations omitted)). But see Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 
868,110 S. Ct. 3 157,3157,111 L. Ed. 2d 666,693 (1990) (stating that "[slome studies 
show . . . children are substantially more vulnerable to suggestion than adults, and often 
unable to separate recollected fantasy (or suggestion) from reality") (Scalia, J., 
dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ.) (citations omitted)). 
76 Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530,545,106 S. Ct. 2056,2064,90 L. Ed. 2d 5 14,528-29 
(1 986); see United States v. Sunmer, 204 F.3d 1 182,1186 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding the 
admission of a child victim's hearsay statement to a clinical psychologist violated the 
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause); United States v. Beaulieu, 194 F.3d 9 18,920 
(8th Cir. 1999) (finding the mother's out-of-court statements were improperly admitted 
as prior consistent statements allegedly to rebut a charge ofrecent fabrication or as state- 
ments for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment); State v. Hinnant, 35 1 N.C. 
277,289,523 S.E.2d 663,671 (2000) (concluding hearsay testimony of a child victim 
is not admissible under the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to hearsay rule). 
There is a "presumption of inadmissibility accorded accusatory hearsay statements 
not admitted pursuant to a firmly rooted hearsay exception." Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 
805,827,110s. Ct. 3139,3152,111 L. Ed. 2d638,659-60 (1990) (citing Lee,476U.S. 
at 543). 
77497U.S. 805,110S.Ct.3139, 111 L.Ed.2d638(1990). 
78 See Wright, 497 U.S. at 826-27. The child was unavailable as a witness and the 
statements were admittedunder the state's hearsay exception for statements that are not 
specifically covered by any other exception but have equivalent circumstantial guarantees 
of trustworthiness, was offered to prove a material fact, was more probative than any 
other available evidence, and served the interests ofjustice by its admission. Id. at 8 12 
(citing IDAHO R. Evm. 803). 
79 Id. at 826. By contrast, a statement that qualifies for admission under a f d y  
rooted hearsay exception is "so trustworthy that adversarial testing would add little to 
[its] reliability." Id. at 820-21 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,161,90 S. Ct. 
1930, 1936,26 L. Ed. 2d 489,498-99 (1970)). 
Id. at 8 12- 13 (noting the findings by the Idaho Supreme Court included the failure 
to preserve the interview on videotape, use of "blatantly leading questions," and that 
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statements under the Confrontation Clause, the prosecution was required 
to establish that the statements possessed "particularized guarantees of 
trustworthines~."~' Such particularized guarantees of trustworthiness 
could be satisfied when the prosecution offers a child's out-of-court 
statement under one of the traditional, deeply rooted hearsay exceptions 
such as excited  utterance^,^^ or statements made to physicians for 
purposes of diagnosis or treat~nent.'~ However, corroboration of the truth 
of the statement is not a circumstantial guarantee of the declarant's 
tr~stworthiness.~ 
A showing that the child is unavailable is not required under the 
Confrontation Clause as an antecedent for the statement's adrnis~ibility,~~ 
although a showing of unavailability may be required under state child 
hearsay  exception^.^^ When the statement is offered under the residual 
the "interrogation was performed by someone with a preconceived idea of what the child 
should be disclosing"). 
Id. at 815. 
See FED. R. EVID. 803(2). 
83 See FED. R. Evm. 803(4); see also Dnunm v. Commonwealth, 783 S.W.2d 380, 
384 (Ky. 1990) (noting that " [flederal courts have generally followed a liberal approach" 
to this exception). This exception would include statements not only to physicians but 
also to hospital attendants, ambulance drivers, or even members ofthe declarant's family. 
FED. R. Evm. 803(4) advisory committee's note. Statements to a case worker who 
neither diagnosed nor treated the child would not be covered. See, e.g., United States 
v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446,1451 (10th Cir. 1995); Sharp v. Commonwealth, 849 S.W.2d 
542,545-46 (Ky. 1993). Also inadmissible are statements that go beyond information 
that is reasonably necessary for diagnosis or treatment. See, e.g., Tome, 61 F.3d at 1450; 
State v. Coleman, 673 So. 2d 1283, 1287 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that "[platient 
history . . . may not be used to prove the fact that abuse occurred"). However, the 
identity of the perpetrator may be reasonably necessary for medical care and treatment, 
particularly if the perpetrator is a member of the victim's family. See, e.g., Tome, 61 
F.3d at 1450; People v. Meeboer, 181 Mich. App. 365,372-73,449 N.W.2d 124,127 
(Ct. App. 1989), afd, 484 N.W.2d 621 (Mich. 1992). 
" See Wright, 497 U.S. at 824 ("Corroboration of a child's allegations of sexual 
abuse . . ., for example, sheds no light on the reliability of the child's allegations 
regarding the identity of the abuser. There is a very real danger that a jury will rely on 
partial corroboration to mistakenly infer the trustworthiness of the entire statement."). 
"See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,353, 112 S. Ct. 736,741,116 L. Ed. 2d 848, 
854 (1992); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387,392,106 S. Ct. 1121, 1124,89 L. Ed. 
2d 390,394 (1986). 
See State v. Rocha, 191 Ill. App. 3d 529,537,547 N.E.2d 1335,1340,138 Ill. 
Dec. 714,719 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing cases and indicating that inability or hesitancy 
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exception,8' acourt must determine that the statement possesses"particu- 
larized guarantees of tr~stworthiness."~~ Such guarantees maybe shown 
by the child's mental state,89 spontanei~y,~~ consistent repetiti~n,~' lack 
of motive to fabricate:* use of terminology unexpected of a child of 
similar age:3 and the training and experience of the inter~iewer?~ A 
court's failure to give a cautionary instruction after admitting an out-of- 
court statement of a child may be reversible error.95 
IX. Experts 
Child abuse cases are difficult to prosecute when the crime has left no 
physical traces, when the principal witness is very young, and when no 
other corroboration exists. The trial is then a classic credibility contest. 
The increasing use of expert witnesses in child abuse cases may assist the 
jury in understanding the otherwise unusual behavior of the victim, but 
may also unfairly prejudice the defendant to the extent that the expert 
of child to testify constitutes unavailability). But see State v. Rohrich, 82 Wash. App. 
674,679,918 P.2d 512, 514 (Ct. App. 1996) (condemning the prosecutor's tactic of 
calling the child to the stand and asking innocuous questions in order to technically 
comply with the state statute requiring that "[the] child testifly] at the proceedings" 
before offering the child's hearsay statements as a "calculated interference with [the 
defendant's] right to hlly and effectively cross-examine the child"). 
See FED. R. E v ~ .  807. 
See Wright, 497 U.S. at 82 1. 
89 See id. (citing Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941,948 (4th Cir. 1988)). 
See id. (citing State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191,201,735 P.2d 801,811 (1987)). 
9' See id. 
92 See id. at 821-22 (citing State v. Kuone, 243 Kan. 218,221-222,757 P.2d 289, 
292-93 (1988). 
93 See Wright, 497 U.S. at 821 (citing State v. Sorenson, 142 Wis. 2d 226,246,421 
N.W.2d 77, 85 (1988)). 
94 See United States v. Rouse, 11 1 F.3d 561,571-72 (8th Cir. 1997); United States 
v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446, 1453 (10th Cir. 1995). 
95 See People v. McClure, 779 P.2d 864,866-67 (Colo. 1989) (en banc) (discussing 
COLo. SESS. L. 1993, ch. 150, 4 13-25-129(2) (1987) (stating that, while final 
instructions to the jury regarding a child's out-of-court statement will be given, "it is 
for the jury to determine the weight and credit to be given the statement")). 
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vouches for the victim's Courts commonly agree that experts 
may not give testimony that directly endorses the credibility of the com- 
plaining witness, or opines on the defendant's guilt.97 Appellate courts 
find a serious error when an expert asserts directly that the child has been 
abused:* is a truthhl person:9 or that the defendant is guilty of abuse.100 
Although still admissible, such vouching or bolstering may be 
accomplished in a variety of less direct  way^.'^' A clearly improper tactic 
is to elicit testimony that a victim of child abuse rarely fabricates,lo2 or 
% See generally John E.B. Myers et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse 
Litigation, 68 NEB. L. REV. 1 (1 989) (offering a comprehensive discussion ofthe issues). 
97 See, e.g., State v. Leggett, 164 Vt. 599,599-600,664 A.2d 271,271-72 (1995). 
Nor may the defense's expert express an opinion that the complaining witness is 
untruthful. See Rouse, 11 1 F.3d at 571-72. 
"See, e.g., United States v. Velarde, 214 F.3d 1204,121 1 (10thCir. 2000) (stating, 
"testimony which essentially simply vouches for the truthfulness of another witness is 
impermissible") (citingunited States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 125 1,1267 (10thCir. 1999)); 
Smith v. State, 674 So. 2d 791, 794 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (finding error for an 
expert to testify that the child had been abused); People v. Seaman, 657 N.Y.S.2d 242, 
244,239 A.D.2d 681,682 (App. Div. 1997) (not pennitting an expert to insinuate that 
the victim had been sexually molested). 
Some courts distinguish between opinions regarding physical facts observed and 
reported, about which experts may testify, and opinions regarding the behavior of 
victims, about which experts may not testify. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 456 Pa. 
Super. 251,255-56,690 A.2d 274,276-77 (Super. Ct. 1997) (permitting the expert's 
testimony regarding an allegedly sexually abused child's physical condition). 
99 See, e.g., Flowers v. State, 220 Ga. App. 814,815,468 S.E.2d 199,201 (Ct. App. 
1996). 
loo See, e.g., Smith, 674 So. 2d at 794. 
lo' See, e.g., State v. Alexander, 254 Conn. 290, 305, 755 A.2d 868, 877 (2000) 
(granting reversal because a prosecutor improperly expressed her opinion of the victim's 
credibility and vouched for her witness during her closing argument); Commonwealth 
v. LaCaprucia, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 496, 499, 671 N.E.2d 984, 987 (App. Ct. 1996) 
(stating that "inadmissible profile evidence had the effect of identifying the defendant 
as a person likely to commit incestuous sexual abuse, and the complainants as children 
who testified truthfully to the occurrence of sexual abuse" (citation omitted)). 
Io2 See, e.g., People v. Peterson, 450 Mich. 349, 375-76, 537 N.W.2d 857, 869 
(1995) (holding as error an expert's testimony "that children lie about sexual abuse at 
a rate of about two percent"); Commonwealth v. Seese, 5 12 Pa. 439,44 1,5 17 A.2d 920, 
92 1 (1986) (stating it was impermissible for the expert to testify that "[ilt is veryunusual 
that a child would lie about sexual abuse"). 
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possesses certain characteristics indicative of truthfulness.103 Another 
unacceptable technique is to pose a hypothetical question to an expert 
mirroring all of the essential facts in the case relating to the abuse, and 
then asking the expert whether those facts are consistent with abuse.lM 
Courts are divided over the admissibility of expert testimony describ- 
ing "profiles" of sexual abuse victims, or sexual abuse "syndromes. r r los  
To the extent that no consensus exists on the reliability of such psycholog- 
ical profiles, expert testimony that a child exhibits symptoms consistent 
with sexual abuse may invade the province of the jury to decide the 
credibility of the complaining witness.'06 Profile or syndrome testimony 
has been accepted when certain behavioral traits of sexual abuse 
'03 See, e.g., Flowers, 468 S.E.2d at 201 (holding that it was error to allow a child 
counselor to testify that the childmet all ofthe criteria fortruthfdness); Commonwealth 
v. Garcia, 403 Pa. Super. 280,283-84,290,588 A.2d 951,952,956 (Super. Ct. 1991) 
(en banc) (ruling it was improper for an expert to explain why one-third of child victims 
take several years to report their attacks). 
'04 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Federico, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 61 6,618,666 N.E.2d 
10 17,lO 19 (App. Ct. 1996); Commonwealthv. Perkins, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 577,582-84, 
658 N.E.2d 975,979-80 (App. Ct. 1995); People v. Archer, 649 N.Y.S.2d 204,206, 
232 A.D.2d 820,821-22 (App. Div. 1996). 
lo5 Compare Commonwealthv. Allen, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 458,465,665 N.E.2d 105, 
110 (App. Ct. 1996) (stating that "an expert may testify about general syndromes 
associated with sexual abuse"), and Peterson, 537 N.W.2d at 868 (holding that the 
"prosecution may present evidence, if relevant and helpful, to generally explain the 
common postincident behavior of children who are victims of sexual abuse"), with 
Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 577 (Fla. 1997) (finding it error to admit expert 
testimony that a child victim exhibits symptoms consistent with those displayed by a 
child who has been sexually abused), and State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 11 16, 1127 (La. 
1993) (finding it error to allow expert testimony concerning syndrome evidence because 
such evidence has not attained scientific acceptance), and State v. Bolin, 922 S.W.2d 
870,873-74 (Tenn. 1996) (concluding that it is error to admit expert testimony on child 
sexual abuse syndrome). 
lo6 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. LaCaprucia, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 496,498 1~3,671 
N.E.2d 984,986 n.3 (App. Ct. 1996) (fmding that scholarly studies of sexually abused 
children "caution that there are no 'typical' traits or common characteristics that portray 
childsexual abuse" (citationsomitted)); State v. J.Q., 130N.J. 554,573,617A.2d 1196, 
1206 (1993) (discussing that the existence of symptoms may equally appear as a result 
of other disorders and does not necessarily prove abuse); State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 
557, 562 (Tenn. 1993) (stating that "[rlesearch has led us to conclude that no one 
symptom or group of symptoms are readily agreed upon in the medical field that would 
provide a reliable indication of the presence of sexual abuse" (citations omitted)). 
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victims-such as delay in reporting the abuse, refbsing to acknowledge 
that the child had been victimized, or failing to remember specific 
events-may seem confusing or counter-intuitive to lay jurors. lo' Such 
testimony is commonly allowed when used as rehabilitative proof to 
counter discrediting suggestions raised by defense counsel.'08 Expert 
testimony also may be allowed to explain special interviewing protocols 
used to elicit information fiom child victims who are immature, fiight- 
ened, or confused. lo9 Expert testimony becomes highly problematic when 
the expert attempts to link a general profile or syndrome to the specifics 
of a case by opining that the facts are consistent with sexual abuse.'1° The 
expert then may be seen as tacitly validating the victim's claim of abuse, 
or the identity of the abuser. Prejudice is enhanced when the expert is 
the child's treating physician or'therapist.' ' ' 
'''See, e.g., Peterson, 537 N.W.2d at 863 (stating that "expert testimony concerning 
syndrome evidence is sometimes necessary to explain behavioral signs that may c o d b e  
a jury so that it believes that the victim's behavior is inconsistent with that of an or- 
victimof child sexual abuse" (citations omitted)); People v. Archer, 649 N.Y.S.2d 204, 
206,232 A.D.2d 820,821 (App. Div. 1996) (admitting syndrome testimony "limited 
to explaining behavior that might appear unusual to a lay juror"); State v. Leggett, 164 
Vt. 599,600,664 A.2d 271,272 (1995) (stating an expert may testify that children who 
are sexually abused by a family member are more likely to delay reporting the incident 
than children who are abused by strangers). 
Io8See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Minerd, 562 Pa. 46,50,753 A.2d 225,227 (2000) 
(allowing the prosecution to offer testimony of an expert that the absence of physical 
trauma is nevertheless consistent with alleged sexual abuse); see also Peterson, 537 
N.W.2d at 867-68; State v. Jones, 71 Wash. App. 798,819-20,863 P12d 85,98-99 (Ct. 
App. 1993). 
Io9 See, e.g., State v. Gersin, 76 Ohio St. 3d 491,494,668 N.E.2d 486,488 (1996). 
110 See, e.g., Allen, 665 N.E.2d at 1 10 (finding that an "expert must not connect the 
complainant to the syndrome"); LaCaprucia, 67 1 N.E.2d at 987 (stating that "the expert 
gave characteristic sexual profile testimony that presented the defendant's family 
situation as prone to sexual abuse, suggesting to the jury that this was a reliable factor 
as to whether sexual abuse occurred"); Peterson, 537 N.W.2d at 869 (finding error when 
the trial court allowed an expert to make numerous references to the consistencies 
between the victim's behavior and the behavior of typical victims of child abuse); State 
v. Chamberlain, 137N.H.414,419,628 A.2d704,707 (1993) (finding prejudicial error 
when an expert testified that the complainant's behavior was consistent with child sexual 
abuse victims); J. Q., 6 17 A.2d at 12 1 1 (fmding prejudicial error when an expert testified 
that the victim's symptoms were consistent with sexual abuse). 
"I See Allen, 665 N.E.2d at 11 1 (suggesting that "it is the better practice to avoid 
using the treating therapist as an expert on syndromes associated with sexual abuse, as 
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By the same token, courts have allowed experts to testifLon improper 
interviewing techniques of children and the possibility that a false 
memory has been implanted in a child through improper and suggestive 
interviewing  technique^."^ When a particularized showing is made that 
improper interview techniques were used, a party is allowed to introduce 
expert testimony to aid the jury in evaluating the reliability of a child's 
recollections and whether false memory has possibly been implanted.'13 
X. Conclusion 
Increasing concerns over prosecuting child sexual abusers and the 
immaturity, vulnerability and impressionability of children as witnesses 
have led courts and lawmakers to broaden procedural and evidentiary 
rules governing the testimony of child witnesses. This relatively recent 
development has made it much easier to prosecute persons accused of 
child sexual abuse. At the same time, these new rules raise serious 
questions about the reliability of the child's testimony and whether 
innocent persons are more likely to be convicted of extraordinarily serious 
crimes. Indeed, of the thirty child sexual abuse cases that went to trial 
in the 1980s, more than half of the convictions were reversed on appeal 
because of tainted testimony of child witne~ses.''~ 
As the above discussion demonstrates, courts have increasingly scru- 
tinized on a case by case basis the application of the broadened procedural 
and evidentiaryrules for child witnesses to determine whether these rules 
constitute a permissible adjustment of the traditional standards of trial 
practice in order to assist a traumatized child to give relevant testimony, 
or an impermissible interference with traditional principles of fairness 
it gives rise to the risk that such an expert's testimony 'can be construed as impliedly 
supporting the truthfulness of [the complainant]"' (citations omitted)); LaCaprucia, 67 1 
N.E.2d at 988 (stating that a "therapist who testifies to general syndromes might be 
viewed as implicitly endorsing the complainant's testimony by virtue ofthe fact that she 
has accepted the complainant into therapy" (citations omitted)). 
See, e.g., State v. Sargent, 144 N.H. 103, 106,738 A.2d 351,354 (1999). 
' I 3  See Sargent, 738 A.2d at 354. 
'I4 See Dana D. Anderson, Note, Assessing the Reliability of Child Testimony in 
Sexual Abuse Cases, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 2 1 17, 2 1 17 n. 1 (1 996). 
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contained in constitutional guarantees of confiontation and due process. 
Whether the balance has been skewed too heavily in favor of effective 
prosecution at the expense of protecting a defendant's procedural rights 
is unsettled, but clearly it is one of the most controversial issues in 
criminal trial litigation today. 
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